

17 April 1979

Return Thru
*19 Apr 79*1. LEAKS - serious and destructive effect of leaks

e.g. SALT

- Facts:
- o monitoring vs verifying
 - o need for DCI impartiality - how retains
 - o no single means to monitor any provision
 - o every provision different confidence level
 - o decision up to Congress not DCI

Discussion/conjecture on specific means of monitoring

- o meaningless because no one means is adequate
- o misleads public (e.g. loss of Iran sites; use of U-2, etc)
- o damages chances for real assessment of worth of SALT

Role of the press

- o can provide real service to public and carry out role of informing by
 - not being taken in by pieces of information
 - informing selves thoroughly so that can appreciate how misleading pieces can be
 - put leaks of pieces into prospective for audience
 - foregoing some of the sensation which is bound to be created as all sides selectively leak pieces supporting their view/damaging to other side
- o can do real harm by
 - not doing any of the above
 - not demanding balance - especially in SALT, no single pro or con is meaningful to the worth or lack of worth of the whole treaty.

Most important message to the public:

- o treaty is extremely complex aggregation of many highly technical provisions
- o to say that the "treaty" is verifiable or is not verifiable is the same as saying that electricity is good or bad. That has no meaning. It depends on how it is used, by whom, and when. Sometimes it is good (as when it powers a respirator); sometimes it is bad (as when someone is killed touching a power cable). Each provision must be looked at separately.
- o because some provisions are less positively verifiable than others doesn't mean the whole treaty is worthless
- o in sum - avoid generalities/being drawn into broad value judgments

2. CHARTERS - the DCI and the IC want them, but time is working against us

Pendulum effect

- o Senate version (S.2525) - reaction to Church - very restrictive
- o Admin version - reaction to Church & S2525 - sincere attempt to balance need for regulation with ability to carry out mandate (e.g. Entebbe & assassination)
- o perception that meaningful charters may not be able to be written or might not need to be written (recent press stories)
- o pendulum swinging toward no restrictions

dangerous/wrong because

- o past is easily forgotten
- o intelligence officers deserve some guidance as to what they can and cannot do. Easy to know in the obvious situations, but in the many grey areas where we must work, not fair to leave it up to the man in the field. Either
 - he does what his own standards dictate - may not be the same as yours or the countries, or
 - he is timid, refuses to put his neck on the line and doesn't do what we would like him to do

I am strongly in favor of Charters and have gone on the record many times to that effect. Doing all I can to push along.

3. IC REORGANIZATION - distortions/lack of understanding of change in most press

Important to recognize that:

<u>CHANGE</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
o profound administrative and operation change including many of the players	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o people insecure as to where fit o resentment of change by some older people who interpret it as a repudiation of the old order - it isn't o it's a reflection of changing times/requirements/new era in foreign affairs - must adapt or become obsolete
o consolidated power of DCI under EO	o not a power grab but a recognition that if intel is to be managed centrally (i.e. collection), the manager must have the tools to do so.
o technology and Humint must fit together	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o humint has been sole star - now required to share stage - fearful of future role/resentful o because tech spread over many depts & agencies (humint essentially in 1) tech takes more DCI time/money to manage. Newness of tech also demands time to develop procedures. o humint funding same o big test - integrate best of both. one no more important than other.
o analysis - shift from short to long term	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o resisted by analysts - action/rewards in short term work. More exciting o NIE is DCI's estimate, therefore, would be foolish not to become involved-ensure it's solid
o openness policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o forced by Church Cmte, ergo no choice o good for IC - builds public support

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